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Abstract: Traditional wireless security focuses on preventing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
communications from suspicious eavesdropping and/or jamming attacks. However, there is a growing
need for governments to keep malicious UAV communications under legitimate surveillance. This paper
first investigates a new surveillance paradigm for monitoring suspicious UAV communications via
jamming suspicious UAVs. Due to the power consumption limitation, the choice of eavesdropping
and jamming will reflect the performance of the UAVs communication. Therefore, the paper analyses
the UAV’s eavesdropping and jamming models in different cases, and then proposes the model to
optimize the data package in the constraints of lower power consumption, which can be solved by
the proposed selection policy. The simulation results validate our proposed selection policy in terms
of power consumption and eavesdropped packets. In different fading models, power consumption
increases with time, regardless of distances, and our proposed policy performs better in Weibull
fading channels in terms of eavesdropped packets.
Keywords: selection policy; eavesdropping; jamming; fading channel; UAV
1. Introduction
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) techniques have been widely applied to wireless
communication systems such emergency rescue, homeland security, etc., owing to the flexible and
quick deployment. Researchers from academia, industry, government agencies, etc., have paid lots
of attractions to UAV communications. Game theory has been adopted to deal with a smart attacker
from UAV [1]. Traditional UAV network security studies generally assume UAV communications are
authorized and rightful, so researchers put great efforts to preventing existing UAV communications
form malicious attacks such as jamming and eavesdropping [2–5]. However, the paradigm has changed
with the development of UAV technologies. Terrorists or criminals may use UAVs to establish wireless
communications for committing crimes and terrorism [6,7]. For instance, the eavesdroppers in the
UAV communication networks can overhear the secure message, thus improving the capacity of
communication network by reporting faked channel state information on the basis of the continuously
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changing channel environments [8,9]. More seriously, criminals can use UAV communication networks
to commit bombing activities, and business spies may use them to filch trade secrets.
In traditional UAV surveillance works, eavesdropping and jamming UAVs are usually static
during their tasks, while in this paper, we consider the UAV’s dynamic motion, which can reflect the
performance of jamming selection on power consumption. The policy can provide the optimal results
of eavesdropping and jamming selection based on power consumption in different locations. As shown
in Figure 1, authorized UAVs share information through an existing UAV network, which may change
topology occasionally because of UAV’s unpredictable trajectory. The new infrastructure-free mobile
communication can be easily used by malicious UAVs (marked as red ones), e.g., criminals, terrorists,
and business spies, to commit crimes, jeopardize public safety, invade the secret database of other
companies, etc., thus imposing new challenges on the public security [1]. Therefore, there is a growing
need for government agencies to legitimately monitor and eavesdrop wireless communications of
suspicious UAVs [8].
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Figure 1. A malicious eavesdropping scenario where malicious nmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) attack
authorized UAVs through the UAV n twork.
In particular, we consider four surveillanc rios as shown in Figure 2, wher a legi imate
UAV, i.e., UAVL, aims to onitor a suspicious communication link from a suspicious UAV transmitter
(UAVST) to a UAV receiver (UAVSR) over fading channels. It is seldom to have significant multipath
links in the sky. However, flying UAVs are strictly restricted according to policies. It is allowed for
flying UAVs freely under some low altitudes, which are even lower than tall buildings, and what
is more, extreme weather conditions may also influence the state of communication links for UAVs,
so there are still scenarios for UAVs communication in multipath links. In reality, UAV transmitter and
UAV receiver are relative, since communication links are bi-directional, using a pair of transmitter and
receiver for simultaneous transmission in both directions.
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In this scenario, we assume that the suspicious pair of UAVs (known as UAVST and UAVSR) has
been detected by authorized agencies at the beginning, and they are eavesdropped by a legitimate
UAV monitor (UAVL). Suspicious users’ detection and association can be referred to in Reference [9].
We use the eavesdropping model proposed by Jie Xu, et al. [10] which proactively generate
jamming signals to interfere with the suspicious communication link through a full-duplex mode,
so as to decrease the achievable data rate at the suspicious transmitter or receiver for overhearing
more efficiently.
In order to initialize investigation, we assume that no advanced anti-eavesdropping schemes
for security are employed by suspicious UAVs. Based on such assumptions, UAVL can overhear
information successfully from the suspicious UAVs only when the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
(and accordingly the achievable data rate) at UAVL is no smaller than that at UAVSR, since in this case
UAVL can decode the data that can be decoded at UAVSR [10]. Let RL and RS denote the achievable
data rate of the legitimate eavesdropping link form UAVST to UAVL and the communication rate
of the suspicious link form UAVST to UAVSR, respectively. Then, UAVL can decode transmitted
signal correctly (with arbitrarily small error) if, and only if, RL is no smaller than RS. We define the
eavesdropping rate RE as the suspicious data rate that UAVL can successfully decode, which is given
as RE = RS if RL ≥ RS, and RE = 0 if RL < RS. UAVST and UAVSR are assumed to fly following
a collision-free formation, where they keep a prescribed relative distance and angle. There are
four cases for UAVL to successfully eavesdrop suspicious communication link. Case 1, as shown
in Figure 2a, UAVL eavesdrops suspicious UAVST by sending jamming signals to UAVSR. In this
case, UAVST increases transmission power in order to sustain RS at its original level, thus increasing
RL inevitably in the eavesdropping link. When RL is no smaller than RS, UAVL is able to decode
the whole information that can be decoded at UAVSR to fulfill eavesdropping missions. Case 2,
as shown in Figure 2b, UAVL eavesdrops suspicious UAVST by sending jamming signals to UAVSR.
Take the time-division-duplex (TDD) multi-antenna transmission scheme as an example, where UAVST
designs its transmit beamforming vectors based on the reverse-link channel estimation from UAVSR.
In that case, UAVST can spoof the reverse-link transmit signals received by UAVST, such that UAVST
estimates a fake channel, and changes its beamforming direction towards UAVL and away from
UAVSR [11]. This approach increases RL and decreases RS, and accordingly improves RE. Case 3,
as shown in Figure 2c, UAVL eavesdrops suspicious UAVSR by sending jamming signals to UAVSR.
In that case, UAVSR increases transmission power in order to sustain RS at its original level, thus
increasing RL inevitably in the eavesdropping link. When RL is no smaller than RS, UAVL is able to
decode the whole information that can be decoded at UAVST to fulfill eavesdropping missions. Case 4,
as shown in Figure 2d, UAVL eavesdrops suspicious UAVSR by sending jamming signals to UAVST.
Take the time-division-duplex (TDD) multi-antenna transmission scheme as an example, where UAVSR
designs it’s transmit beamforming vectors based on the reverse-link channel estimation from UAVST.
In that case, UAVSR can spoof the reverse-link transmit signals received by UAVSR, such that UAVSR
estimates a suspicious channel, and changes its beamforming direction towards UAVL and away from
UAVST [12]. This approach increases RL and decreases RS, and accordingly improves RE.
We have previously discussed the first approach to eavesdrop suspicious communication link
by jamming UAVSR, as shown in Figure 2a [13], so this paper mainly focuses on the other three
eavesdropping and jamming cases, as shown in Figure 2b–d. In practice, UAV’s trajectory period
depends on the battery charge. Low power consumption can make sure the UAV fly in a relative long
period. In this paper, we aim to (1) minimize the power consumption at UAVL, and to (2) maximize
the eavesdropping rate at UAVL. Specifically, when the constraint of suspicious data rate is given,
we formulate an optimization problem to find the most efficient jamming power allocation at UAVL to
maximize the eavesdropping rate, which is polynomially solvable. Moreover, we propose a selection
policy to facilitate the simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming for UAVL on the flight, which
also derives the optimal jamming power by using linear programming. In particular, the proposed
policy allocates the jamming power over the fading channel according to the limited jamming power
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constraint, as well as the position of UAVL. The impacts of fading states on the performance of our
policy are analyzed by applying the proposed policy to four common fading models, i.e., Rayleigh,
Ricean, Weibull, and Nakagami.
In our paper, we considered the topology between the legitimate UAV and two suspicious UAVs
is a semi-circle with a diameter D. We mainly consider an optimal policy strategy for the legitimate
UAV to obtain a good performance on monitoring. From the analysis, it is clear that the distance
between UAVs is the key to the problem. Thus, considering UAVs’ distance is much more meaningful
compared to the trajectory design in our model. In fact, the change of trajectories causes the change
of distances between legitimate UAV and suspicious UAV, so we can apply our results in various
trajectories. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
(1) Traditional works focused on achieving secure UAV-ground (U2G) communications in the
presence of terrestrial eavesdroppers/jammers, while in our paper, we considered UAV-UAV
(U2U) communications in the air, so we formulated suspicious UAVs’ distance model, which
considered the dynamic mobility of suspicious UAVs in sequence time slots;
(2) Traditional works usually consider one case for eavesdropping and jamming, while in our
paper, we proposed four cases of eavesdropping and jamming over fading channels, and then
formulated an optimization problem to find the most efficient jamming power allocation at UAVL
to maximize the eavesdropping rate;
(3) Traditional works focus on improving power consumptions or data receive rate respectively,
while in our paper, we proposed a selection policy to facilitate the simultaneous eavesdropping
and jamming for UAVL on the flight, which allocated the jamming power over the fading channel
according to the limited jamming power constraint as well as the position of UAVL.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces related works on security
techniques in UAV networks. In Section 3, we design the system model on legitimate eavesdropping
and jamming. Section 4 proposes the problem formulation and selection policy, as well as the
complexity and feasible solution analysis. Simulation results are shown in Section 5, followed by a
conclusion in Section 6.
2. Related Works
In the literature, there have been a handful of methods for preventing existing wireless networks
(e.g., cellular networks) from malicious attacking since wireless networks are prone to malicious
attacks such as eavesdropping attack [12], DoS attack [14], spoofing attack [15], MITM attack [16],
message falsification/injection attack [17], etc. For instance, authorized devices in a wireless network
can, by interference, be illegal devices in the same network in terms of information stealing or virus
attacking. Moreover, malicious device may overhear wireless communications sessions, as long as it is
within the transmit coverage area of the transmitting device. Generally speaking, the requirements
of confidentiality, availability, integrity, and authenticity should be satisfied by secure wireless
communications [18]. Cryptographic techniques for preventing eavesdroppers from intercepting
data transmissions between legitimate users are typically employed by existing communication
systems, thus maintaining confidential transmission in wireless networks [19,20]. For example,
passive eavesdropping is applicable to intercept infrastructure-free wireless communications (e.g., UAV
networks) [21].
Recently, physical-layer security has emerged as a promising solution to secure UAV communications
against eavesdropping attacks [22–25]. The authors in Reference [22] proposed an algorithm to adaptively
control the UAV’s location over time to optimize UAV’s average secrecy rate basing on a secure
single-UAV communication system. In Reference [23], authors regarded UAVs as friendly jammers to
protect the ground wireless communication, while authors in References [24,25] employed UAVs as
mobile relays to facilitate secure or reliable wireless communications. Authors in [26] introduced a
power allocation strategy which was regarded as a zero-sum game between the transmitter and the
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eavesdropper. In Reference [27], authors considered a power control strategy based on Q-learning for
the transmitter to enhance the secure capacity via preventing from smart attacks in the dynamic game,
however, authors in Reference [27] did not consider the practical channel estimation error, which
should not be ignored in the practical communication scenarios, since it will give a significant impact
on the network performance. The authors in Reference [28] proposed the optimal power allocation
strategies by studying the impact of channel estimation error on the capacity of specific channels.
Authors in Reference [29] proposed a theoretical communication scheme, which use multiple antennas
to generate artificial noise to degrade the channel quality of eavesdroppers. In Reference [30], authors
proposed a low-density parity-check protocol, which used a four-step procedure to ensure wireless
information-theoretic security, to achieve communication rates close to the fundamental security limits
in wireless communications. However, none of these works [22–30] consider the use of proactive
eavesdropping to enhance network security.
In order to enhance the quality of secure wireless transmissions, jamming the eavesdropper is
an effective approach [31–33]. Authors in Reference [31] presented a cooperative jamming scheme,
which help a legitimate user improve its data rate via sending a jamming signal to the eavesdropper.
The authors in Reference [32] presented a hybrid artificial fast fading scheme, which achieved
better performance for eavesdropper. In Reference [33], authors proposed a full-duplex scheme,
which transmitted the jamming signal to degrade the channel of eavesdropper. Under this scheme,
the system was no longer interference-limited, compared with the half-duplex case. Reference [34]
formulated a stochastic game, and provided insights for secret and reliable communication against
both jamming and eavesdropping. However, authors in References [31–34] considered eavesdropping
as an illegitimate attack and targeted on decreasing the eavesdropping performance. Authors in
References [35–37] focused on achieving secure UAV-ground (U2G) communications in the presence
of terrestrial eavesdroppers/jammers, they did not consider UAV-UAV (U2U) communications in
the air. Reference [12] discussed how an active eavesdropper can attack the training phase in
wireless communication to improve its eavesdropping performance, however, Reference [12] did
not consider the mobility of UAVs in their communications, and Reference [12] just considered the
case of eavesdropping and jamming. In general, there is a lack of researches on power consumption
controlling, legitimately eavesdropping and selection policy towards suspicious UAV communications.
3. System Model
3.1. Assumptions
We consider that the distance between suspicious UAV transmitter (UAVST) and receiver (UAVSR)
is denoted as D meters. The distance can be calculated in the subsequent time slot, considering the
dynamic mobility of the two UAVs. Without loss of generality, we consider legitimate eavesdropper
(UAVL) patrols in a predetermined circular trajectory between UAVST and UAVSR with a diameter
D, particularly, the wireless link dynamics that are affected by the distance between UAVL and the
suspicious UAVs are identical on a semi-circle of the trajectory. As a result, we consider the trajectory
of UAVL as a semi-circle, even though the distance between UAVL is dynamic with time-depend.
The suspicious communication between UAVST and UAVSR consists of m number of time slots,
and each time slot is denoted as x. We assume that UAVST communicates with UAVSR in a TDMA
fashion, however, it should be noted that our method is generalized and thus agnostic of the MAC
protocol in use. In our proposed model, we assume that the suspicious UAVs consider the UAVL’s
eavesdropping signal as interference during the wireless communication.
In fact, our policy proposed in Section IV is general and can support other shapes of flight
trajectory since we have considered different fading channels with path loss that is affected by the
distance between hostile UAV pairs, regardless of trajectories of UAVs. Moreover, Table 1 lists the
fundamental variables that have been used in our system model.
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Table 1. Notations and variables.
Variables Descriptions
PL(x) Legitimate monitor consuming power (PE(x) + PJ(x)) at time slot x
PE(x) Legitimate monitor eavesdropping power at time slot x
PJ(x) Legitimate monitor jamming power at time slot x
γe(x) SNR of eavesdropping link at time slot x
γs(x) SNR of suspicious link at time slot x
K1, K2 Two constants relating to the channel
N0 Power of white Gaussian noise
d1(x) Distance between UAVL and UAVST at time slot x
d2(x) Distance between UAVL and UAVSR at time slot x
PmaxL Maximum consuming power of UAVL
PtotalL Total jamming power of UAVL
n Gaussian random number
α1, α2 Path-loss exponent of wireless channel
λ
Coefficient considered to adjust the weights of the autocorrelated component and
independent component
δ SINR/SNR threshold
ρ(x) Adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) rate at time slot x
e The required instantaneous bit error rate
3.2. Suspicious UAVs’ Distance Model
The distance between UAVL and UAVST, and the distance between UAVL and UAVSR relate to the
performance of eavesdropping and jamming. Therefore, we will discuss the suspicious UAVs’ distance
model in this part, which is based on the position of UAVL and the suspicious UAVs’ dynamic mobility.
As shown in Figure 3, the distance between UAVL and UAVST at time slot x, which was denoted
as d1(x), can be described as:
d1(x) =
√(
D
2
− D
2
cos θ(x)
)2
+
(
D
2
sin θ(x)
)2
=
√
2D
2
√
1− cos θ(x) (1)
Additionally, the distance between UAVL and UAVSR, d2(x), is given by d2(x) =
√
D2 − d21(x).
Note that d1(x) and d2(x) can be also estimated by other ways, e.g., measuring receiving signal
strength, or signal angle of arrival of UAVST or UAVSR.
The angle variation θ(x) depends on the real-time position of UAVL. However, as shown in
Figure 4, the results of d1(x) is the same as Equation (1), because the expression of variations a and b
can be transformed under the condition of θ < pi/2, which means that
a =
D
2
sin(pi − θ(x)) = D
2
sin θ(x), b =
D
2
+
D
2
cos(pi − θ(x)) = D
2
− D
2
cosθ(x) (2)
The model is two-dimensional, and considers the dynamic mobility of suspicious UAVs in
sequence time slots, as shown in Figure 5. The distance variation D is improved as a dynamic variation
that relates to the time slot,
D(x) = D(x− 1) + ϕ∆v (3)
Here, ϕ is the duration of each time slot, and ∆v is a vertex that presents the speeds’ difference
value of UAVST and UAVSR. We do not include three-dimensional degrees of freedom for improving
the security, but that will be our future works.
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3.3. Eavesdropping and Jamming Model
Base n the power constraint of UAVs, the suspicious UAVs’ selection for eavesdropping and
jamming is an mportant parameter to be considered in the following algorithm. The optimal selection
depends on the UAVL’s position at time slot x. There are four cases as follows:
Case 1: UAVL eavesdrops and jams UAVST.
As shown in Figure 2a, UAVL only chooses UAVST for eavesdropping and jamming. According
to References [19,38], at time slot xth, the channel gain from UAVST to UAVSR, which was denoted as
Hs(x), is expressed as:
Hs(x) =
λHs(x− 1) + n
√
1− λ2
Dα2
(4)
where α2 denotes the path-loss exponent in the suspicious link and λ presents the coefficient
which adjusts two components: the weights of the auto-correlated and the independent. n is a
Gaussian rand m number generated by Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). For t e suspicious
communication link, we define Signal to I terference pl s Noise Ratio (SINR) at UAVST at time slot x
as γs(x), which is given by
γs(x) =
√
Hs(x)·K−12 l K1e ·
(
2ρ(x) − 1)
N0 + PL(x)
(5)
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where ρ(x) denotes the adaptive modulation and coding (AMC) rate of the UAVST at time slot x, and
the highest mode is denoted by ρM. K1 and K2 are two constants related to the channel. N0 denotes
the power of white Gaussian noise. e is the required instantaneous bit error rate. As elaborated in
the assumption part, the suspicious UAVs consider the UAVL’s eavesdropping signal as interference
during the wireless communication. Hence, the eavesdropping power at time slot x is a part of
interference in suspicious communication. Another part of interference is the jamming power from
UAVL. Therefore, the interference power at time slot x is denoted as PE(x) + PJ(x). Likewise, at time
slot x, the channel gain in the eavesdropping and jamming links, i.e., from UAVST to UAVL, is given by
He(x) = Hj(x) =
λHe(x− 1) + n
√
1− λ2
dα11 (x)
(6)
where n is a Gaussian random number generated by AWGN. α1 denotes the path-loss exponent. d1(x)
is the distance between UAVL and UAVST at time slot x, which can be acquired by Equation (1).
As the relative position of UAVL to UAVST/UAVSR changes from time to time, there are two
components in the eavesdropping link, which named as auto-correlated component and independent
component. The former relies on the previous channel condition and the latter is independent of
previous channels. The two components are adjusted by a coefficient λ. Moreover, λ decreases with
the growth of the speed of UAVL. We define Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) of the eavesdropping and
jamming links at time slot x as γe(x), which is
γe(x) = γj(x) =
√
He(x)·K−12 ln K1e ·
(
2ρ(x) − 1)
N0
(7)
According to the regression model proposed in Reference [20], the PRR of suspicious data packets
eavesdropped by UAVL, which was denoted as R(x), is given by
R(x) =
(
1− 1
2
exp−β0γe(x)+β1
)8(2 f−l)
(8)
where β0 and β1 are two constants in the regression model. Moreover, β0 controls the shape of the
regression curve and β1 induces horizontal shifts of the curve. f and l denote frame size and preamble
size of the data packet, respectively.
Case 2: UAVL eavesdrops UAVST by jamming UAVSR.
As shown in Figure 2b, UAVL chooses UAVST for eavesdropping and UAVSR for jamming. In this
case, the channel gain in the eavesdropping link is the same as in Equation (6), and because of the
jamming object selection of UAVSR, the channel gain in the jamming link is changed as:
Hj(x) =
λHj(x− 1) + n
√
1− λ2
dα12 (x)
(9)
where d2(x) =
√
D(x)2 − d21(x). Accordingly, the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in the jamming link
denotes as:
γj(x) =
√
Hj(x)·K−12 ln K1e ·
(
2ρ(x) − 1)
N0
(10)
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Case 3: UAVL eavesdrops and jams UAVSR.
As shown in Figure 2c, UAVL only chooses UAVST for eavesdropping and jamming. The channel
gains for eavesdropping and jamming links are denoted as:
He(x) = Hj(x) =
λHe(x− 1) + n
√
1− λ2
dα12 (x)
(11)
where d2(x) =
√
D(x)2 − d21(x). Accordingly, the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in the jamming link is
the same as in Equation (7).
Case 4: UAVL eavesdrops UAVSR by jamming UAVST.
As shown in Figure 2d, UAVL chooses UAVST for jamming and UAVSR for eavesdropping. In this
case, the channel gain in the eavesdropping link is the same as in Equation (11), and the channel gain
in the jamming link is the same as in Equation (6).
4. Formulation and Policy
4.1. Problem Formulation
Without loss of generality, we consider the wireless communication, as shown in Figure 2b for the
problem formulation, where UAVL aims to eavesdrop data packets from UAVST via jamming UAVSR.
Note that our algorithm is common in the other three cases because channel gains for eavesdropping
links are associated with D(x) according to Equation (11). D(x) is the only parameter that influences
eavesdropped data packets. Based on the notations in the system model, we formulate the optimization
problem to maximize the eavesdropped data packets via optimizing jamming power. Assume that
each suspicious data packet has b bytes and then successfully eavesdropped data (in bytes) can be
calculated as ∑mx=1 b·R(x) in m time slots. To prevent legitimate jamming and eavesdropping being
detected by suspicious UAVs, SINR of the suspicious link has to be maintained at a certain threshold δ,
which presents γs(x) = δ. Specifically, the modulation of UAVST that is used to transmit data to UAVSR
is 2ρ(x) Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM), where ρ(x) = {1, . . . , ρmax}. ρmax indicates the
number of modulation levels available for rate adaptation. Constraint 0 ≤ ∑mx=1 PL(x) ≤ PtotalL specifies
that the total consuming power (eavesdropping plus jamming) of UAVL during the eavesdropping
period is required to be less than the total obtained power of the UAVL, PtotalL . Constraint PL(x) ≤
PmaxL (∀x, x = 1, 2, . . . , m) specifies that, in each eavesdropping period, UAVL consumes no more than
PmaxL power. Then, the formulation of the problem is presented as follows.
max
PL(x),ρ(x)
∑ mx=1b·R(x) (12)
Subject to:
γs(x) = δ (13)
0 ≤∑ mx=1PL(x) ≤ PtotalL (14)
PL(x) ≤ PmaxL (∀x, x = 1, 2, . . . , m) (15)
1 ≤ ρ(x) ≤ ρmax (16)
Furthermore, in terms of Equation (13), we have
ρ(x) = log2
(
δ2(N0 + PL(x))
Hs(x)·K−12 ln K1e
+ 1
)
(17)
which indicates that the modulation level is adapted by UAVST in terms of the consuming power
PL(x) of UAVL. Specifically, UAVST increases ρ(x) to transmit data with an increasing PL(x) so that
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SINR of the suspicious link at time slot x is maintained at δ. Moreover, considering Equation (5) and
Equation (13), the upper bound and the lower bound of the consuming power PL(x) can be obtained by
PL(x) =

Hs(x)·K−12 ln
K1
e
δ2
− N0 i f ρ(x) = 1
(2ρmax−1)Hs(x)·K−12 ln
K1
e
δ2
− N0 i f ρ(x) = ρmax
(18)
Consequently, by substituting Equations (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) into (13), (14), (15), and (16)
the optimization problem is reformulated as follows:
Optimal Eavesdropping and Jamming Problem:
max
PL(x)
b·
m
∑
x=1
1− 1
2
exp
β1−β0δ
√
He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
·(1+ PL(x)N0 )
8(2 f−l)
Subject to:
0 ≤ ∑mx=1 PL(x) ≤ PtotalL
PL(x) ≤ PmaxL (∀x, x = 1, 2, . . . , m)
PL(x) ≥ Hs(x)·K
−1
2 ln
K1
e
δ2
− N0
PL(x) ≤ (2
ρmax−1)Hs(x)·K−12 ln
K1
e
δ2
− N0
4.2. Selection Policy For Eavesdropping and Jamming
First, the optimal consuming power, P∗L (x) in the optimization problem is able to be derived by
linear optimization techniques, e.g., linear programming. Next, we propose the selection policy to
allocate jamming power for UAVL in real time, as shown in Policy 1. According to Reference [10],
UAVL overhears the channels of suspicious and eavesdropping link via channel probing, so the channel
gains Hs(x), He(x), Hj(x) and N0 are known by UAVL at the beginning of time slot x. Since γs(x) = δ
is required by UAVL to successfully eavesdrop the suspicious transmission, we have
PL(x) ≥
N0·
(
Hs(x)− He(x)− Hj(x)
)
He(x) + Hj(x)
where ρ(x) is given by Equation (11). Therefore, the jamming power at x = k is initialized as
P0L(k) =
N0·
(
Hs(x)− He(x)− Hj(x)
)
He(x) + Hj(x)
Next, initialized jamming and eavesdropping power P0L(k) is examined by UAVL if the four
constraints in the optimization problem are satisfied. Specifically, if one of the constraints does
not hold, it indicates that the required jamming power is much higher than the optimal solution,
i.e., the link quality of the eavesdropping link is too low to decode the suspicious packet. In this
case, UAVL does not send the jamming signal to suspicious UAVs for the purpose of power efficiency.
Moreover, if ∑k−1x=1 PL(x) + P
0
L(k) ≤ PmaxL and constraints (14), (15), and (16) hold, the optimization
problem is derived by UAVL, and the optimal consuming power P∗L (x) is obtained.
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Policy 1 Selection Policy
1: BEGIN:
2: k: denotes the current time slot, x: denotes the duration of time slot.
3: INPUT: D(0), n, λ, α, α2,∆v
4: If ∆v = 0 then
5: D = D(0)
6: Else
7: D(k) = D(k− 1) = kx∆v
8: End if
9: Acquire: Hs(k), γs(k) via D(k)
10: Acquire: UAVL’s position: d1(k), d2(k)
11:
While
E(k) = [0, 1]T
∣∣∣|E(k) = [1, 0]T |∣∣∣J(k) = [0, 1]T ||J(k) = [1, 0]T
do
12: Acquire: PL(k) = PeL(k) + P
j
L(k)
13: power set in all cases:
{
PiL(k)
}
, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
14: End while
15: For i = 1 : 4, i ++ do
16: If the Equations (13) (14) (15) then
17: derive Power-efficient package rate maximum problem
18: Acquire Pi∗L (k)
19: else
20: Pi∗L (k) = 0, E(k) = [0, 0]
T , J(k) = [0, 0]T
21: Endif
22: endfor
23: P∗L (k) = min
{
Pi∗L (k)
}
, i∗ = argmin
{
Pi∗L (k)
}
24: Output: E(k) = Ei∗(k), J(k) = Ji∗(k)
25: If E(k) = E(k− 1)&&J(k) = J(k− 1) then
26: UAVL doesn’t shift the eavesdropping-jamming model.
27: else
28: UAVL shifts the eavesdropping-jamming model from E(k− 1), J(k− 1) to E(k), J(k)
29: endif
30: k = k + 1
31: Go back to line 6 until k = m + 1
32: END
4.3. Policy Analysis
4.3.1. Computing Complexity
Note that the power consumption of executing selection policy is much smaller than the
jamming power of UAVL, which is negligible. The time complexity of selection policy is denoted
as O
(
n2m + nm
)
. Based on [13], the time complexity of Power Efficient Legitimate Eavesdropping
(PELE) that calculate the optimal power result is O(m) which depends on the number of time slots.
Considering the number of cases used in eavesdropping and jamming models, which are denoted as n,
the selection policy’s time consumption in finding optimal power solutions is O(nm). After calculating
optimal power consumptions in all cases in each time slot, the algorithm uses the Bubble method [39]
to acquire the minimum power in all cases, which are denoted as O
(
n2
)
in each time slot and O
(
mn2
)
in the whole eavesdropping and jamming process.
Therefore, the selection policy’s time complexity can be denoted as O
(
n2m + nm
)
, where n
denotes the number of cases and m denotes the number of time slots.
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In our research, we find that it is a challenging problem to solve the optimal number of time
slots for accurate resolution of the optimization problem. As the complexity increases, it is really
difficult to obtain the optimal number of slots for accurate resolution of our problem. Due to the
limitations on laboratory equipment, we only discuss the algorithm performance with six time slots in
our simulations. Our further research is to design an algorithm to research the optimal number of slots
for accurate resolution of the optimization problem.
4.3.2. Feasible Solution
Regarding the proposed Optimal Eavesdropping and Jamming Problem, we will discuss whether
it has the feasible solution or not. Based on Reference [40], the optimization model that has the feasible
solution should satisfy three constraints: (a) The variable is effective collection based on the constraints
in the optimization model, (b) the objective of the optimization model is the continuous function, and
(c) the objective of the optimization model is a convex function. We will prove these three properties in
this part.
First, we will discuss the variable’s effective collection under the constraints in our proposed
optimization model. The constraints 0 ≤ ∑mx=1 PL(x) ≤ PtotalL and PL(x) ≤ PmaxL (∀x, x = 1, 2, . . . , m)
relates to the practice in the reality, which defines PL(x)’s maximums of upper and lower bound.
The last two constraints should be proved, satisfying the effective collection. They make further
definition of PL(x)’s upper and lower bound, furthermore, the relationship between
Hs(x)·K−12 ln
K1
e
δ2
−N0
and (2
ρmax−1)Hs(x)·K−12 ln
K1
e
δ2
− N0 should be considered. In fact, the parameters Hs(x), K−12 , and δ2 are
larger than zero. K1 is larger than e, which means that ln
K1
e > 0, then the last two constraints can be
transformed into:
1 ≤ δ
2PL(x)
Hs(x) K−12 ln
K1
e
≤ 2ρmax − 1
ρmax is a parameter that is larger than 1. Therefore, the variable PL(x) has the effective collection
under the four constraints in the optimization model.
Second, we will discuss the objective’s consecutiveness in the optimization model. Obviously,
the objective is a composite function, which uses the constant function, power function, exponential
function and the logarithmic function based on PL(x), Hs(x), He(x), and Hj(x). It is easy to prove
that the functions of PL(x), Hs(x), He(x), and Hj(x) are all continuous functions. Moreover, the sum
function does not affect the function’s consecutiveness. Therefore, the objective in our proposed
Optimal Eavesdropping and Jamming Problem is a continuous function.
Finally, we will discuss whether the objective in our proposed Optimal Eavesdropping and
Jamming Problem is a convex function or not. In order to simplify, we define the objective function as
G(x), where
G(x) =
1− 1
2
exp
β1−β0δ
√
He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
·(1+ PL(x)N0 )
8(2 f−l)
We have proved that the objective is a continuous function in the above paragraph, and then the
convex property can be proved by the second derivation, which is denoted as:
G′′ (x) = −bln[8(2 f − l)]· 12 exp
(
β1 − β0δ
√
He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
·
(
1+ PL(x)N0
))
·ln 12
[(He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
)′′
+
(
PL(x)
N0
He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
)′′]
According to the non-negativity of exponential function, the second term of G′′ (x) will be larger
than zero. Regarding the first term of G′′ (x), the preamble size l is always smaller than the frame size
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f in the practice, then the result of 8(2 f − l) will be larger than 1, thus the first term is smaller than 0.
Regarding the third term of G′′ (x), which is denoted as:(He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
)′′
1
N0
[
2P′L(x)
(He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
)′
+ PL(x)
(He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
)′′
+P′′L (x)
(He(x)+Hj(x)
Hs(x)
)]
≥ 0
Therefore, the first term G′′ (x) is smaller than zero, and the second and the third terms are larger
than zero. The second derivate result is smaller than zero. The objective of our proposed Optimal
Eavesdropping and Jamming Problem is a convex function.
Finally, from the discussions above, we have the conclusions that: (1) The time complexity of
selection policy is O
(
n2m + nm
)
, and (2) our proposed Optimal Eavesdropping and Jamming Problem
has the feasible solution.
5. Numerical Results
In this section, we provide simulation results to verify the performance of our proposed selection
policy. Furthermore, we choose four normal fading channels, e.g., Rayleigh, Ricean, Weibull, and
Nakagami, to investigate the impacts on our proposed selection policy.
5.1. Simulation Configurations
The distance between the two suspicious UAVs is D, which various from 500 m to 2000 m, and the
path length of UAVL is piD/2. The patrolling speed of UAVL is set to 10 m/s. In fact, we do realize the
policies for using UAVs in our country. It is allowed for flying UAVs freely under altitudes of 120 m.
In our research, the distance variation (from 500 m to 2000 m) is mainly in the same altitude, which
can be within the permission of policies. We use MATLAB to conduct the experiments instead of an
actual simulator, however, the experiments can be legally carried if there are enough equipped UAVs.
The detailed system-level simulation parameters are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Simulation Parameters.
Parameters Values
K1 0.2
K2 3
β0 2.6
β1 1
ϕ 60
ϕv [−10, 10]
θ [0, pi]
f 20
l 10
e 0.05
N0 3.98 × 10−12 W
b 100 bytes
δ 3
λ 0.3
n 0.005377
α1 3
α2 2.5
D 500 m, 1000 m, 1500 m, 2000 m
PmaxL 8 × 10−6 W
ρ 1, 2, 4, 8
Constant
Jamming Power 10
−8 W
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UAVST communicates with UAVSR in a TDMA fashion for suspicious collision-free transmission.
Especially, we consider that a TDMA frame contains 6 time slots, and each of which is 10 s long.
In one time slot, UAVST transmits its data to UAVSR, where UAVL eavesdrops and decides to jam
the suspicious communication according to the selection policy. In addition, the suspicious link,
eavesdropping link, and jamming link are assumed to be block-fading, i.e., the channels remain
unchanged during each transmission block, and may change from block to block.
5.2. Eavesdropping Rate and Power Consumption
For comparison, we consider other two legitimate eavesdropping strategies: proactive eavesdropping
with constant jamming power and zero jamming power. For the former scheme, we set the constant
jamming power to 10−8 W (in fact, the constant jamming power can be set to any value below PmaxL ,
which has little effects on simulation results as observed in the performance). For the latter scheme, we
set the constant jamming power to 0, which means UAVL passively overhears the packets transmitted
by suspicious UAVs without sending jamming signal to the suspicious link [17,18,21].
Figure 6 shows that selection policy saves 65.79%, 52.66%, 78.12%, and 13.92% more power than
the constant-Jamming scheme, when D = 500 m, 1000 m, 1500 m, and 2000 m, respectively. Selection
policy saves 74.73%, 39.02%, 74.35%, and 8.40% more power than the No-Jamming scheme, when
D = 500 m, 1000 m, 1500 m, and 2000 m, respectively. The power consumption of selection policy
increases as time goes on in each simulation. The reason is that UAVL consumes power to eavesdrop
suspicious UAVs either by jamming or not, thus the power consumption increases as time goes on.
Power consumptions are not compared with each other under different distances, because in each
simulation, UAVs fly at random speeds (e.g., random ∆v), thus causing different power consumptions
that cannot simply be compared with each other.
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Figure 7 presents the other two methods with optimal solutions in terms of the eavesdropped
packets. Selection policy outperforms No-Jamming and Constant-Jamming schemes under different
distances in the simulations. The reason is that selection policy purposely adapts the jamming power
of UAVL to change the suspicious communication (e.g., to a smaller data rate) for overhearing more
packets. In each eavesdropping time slot, UAVL selects proper eavesdropping case according to the
selection policy, thus eavesdropping more information. When D = 500 m, selection policy outperforms
the other two schemes by nearly 1.2 times. However, the divisions between the selection policy and the
other two methods are narrowed when distances increase. That is because in such long-distance cases,
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channel conditions dominate the data rate rather than eavesdropping methods, so UAVL can receive
almost the same number of eavesdropped packets regardless which algorithm UAVL has chosen.
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5.3. Impact of Typical Fading Models
We apply selection policy into four typical fading channel models, i.e., Rayleigh, Ricean, Weibull
and Nakagami, to study the impacts. Each fading channel is characterized with a specific coefficient
component. In particular, the coefficient component of Rayleigh, Rician, Weibull, and Nakagami is set
to 2, 1, 2, and 0.5, respectively [30].
In Figure 8, total power consumption increases with time going on regardless of distances.
However, power consumption increases more sharply in short-distance cases (D = 500 m).
That is because in short-distance cases, eavesdropping algorithms dominate eavesdropping
performances, while in long-distance cases, fading channels dominate power consumptions rather
than eavesdropping algorithms. This can also be interpreted by the eavesdropped packets in regards
to the time slots, which is shown in Figure 9.
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amount of time the channel remains in a fade. For Nakagami channel with the coefficient component 
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jamming suspicious UAVs according to the selection policy in each time slot. With such policy, 
UAVL can eavesdrop more data by consuming less power. Simulation results showed that selection 
policy outperformed No-Jamming and Constant-Jamming schemes in both power consumption and 
data reception. Moreover, we applied selection policy into four typical fading channels to validate 
the performance, results showed that selection policy performs better in Weibull fading channels in 
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Figure 9 shows that eavesdropped packets under selection policy linearly grows with time in
the four typical fading channels. Selection policy performs best in Weibull fading channel, but not
obviously. Total eavesdropped packets are less in Nakagami fading channel than in other three
channels with different time slots. This is because Weibull distribution is typically descriptive of
channel fading with a dominant line-of-sight (LOS) propagation [41,42], which leads to a small amount
of time the channel remains in a fade. For Nakagami channel with the coefficient component of 0.5,
the received signal consists of a large number of noise waves with randomly distributed amplitudes,
phase, and angles of arrival, which causes distortion and fading of the received signal.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated a proactive eavesdropping and jamming scenario which include
four cases for UAVL to fulfil surveillance tasks. In such a surveillance paradigm, we formulated a
power-efficient eavesdropping and jamming problem which has acceptable computing complexity
and can be solved. Then, we proposed a selection policy for UAVL to allocate eavesdropping and
jamming power efficiently. Particularly, UAVL selects the most efficient case for eavesdropping and
jamming suspicious UAVs according to the selection policy in each time slot. With such policy, UAVL
can eavesdrop more data by consuming less power. Simulation results showed that selection policy
outperformed No-Jamming and Constant-Jamming schemes in both power consumption and data
reception. Moreover, we applied selection policy into four typical fading channels to validate the
performance, results showed that selection policy performs better in Weibull fading channels in terms
of the package received rate (PRR). For future works, we plan to study the problems about jamming
and eavesdropping towards suspicious UAV groups, which is a challenge for eavesdropping and
jamming policy selection.
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